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Afghan Experience Calls for 
   Innovative Approach to DDR
Criminal activities, illegal arms trading and violence against civilians continue threatening 
Afghanistan’s stability and security, and hinder the work of humanitarian nongovernmental organi-
zations. As a result, potential investors are discouraged from making heavy capital investments, and 
NGOs cannot implement projects that could dramatically improve the socioeconomic condition of 
civilians. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration appear to be crucial steps for the success 
of post-conflict recovery in Afghanistan. Conducting DDR in the complex and turbulent Afghan envi-
ronment has proven difficult, and this article explores past attempts at DDR in Afghanistan to draw 
lessons for future efforts.
The Bonn Agreement was a power-sharing arrangement between Northern Alliance fac-
tions and militias that assisted in U.S.-
backed efforts against the Taliban.1 
Over time, these groups have become 
largely self-sufficient. Many of these 
groups were founded in direct oppo-
sition to the central government in 
Kabul, some along ideological lines. 
According to a 2009 report on disar-
mament, demobilization and reintegra-
tion in Afghanistan published by the 
Small Arms Survey, Afghanistan’s 
various interest groups include “mul-
tiple Mujahedeen parties, tribal militias, 
warlords, paramilitary organizations, a 
trained state officer corps, armed intel-
ligence services, and both mono-eth-
nic and multi-ethnic armed groups and 
alliances.”1 Established under the Bonn 
Agreement, the government was com-
prised of many autonomous groups 
whose allegiance to the state and one 
another was questionable.2 
The disarmament process reflected 
these divisions, and as a tentative agree-
ment between volatile allies, the process 
was slow. Strict disarmament efforts were 
viewed as a risk to the new state’s author-
ity and solidarity, as many of the leaders 
who drafted the Bonn Agreement were 
involved with armed groups. The Bonn 
Agreement called for the Mujahedeen 
militias of the Northern Alliance and 
the other armed groups outside the 
government to be dissolved, reorga-
nized as the Afghan Military Forces 
and brought under the auspices of the 
Afghan Ministry of Defense. However, 
the agreement did little to determine the 
actual disarmament process.1
In 2002, the government established 
the Afghan National Army and dis-
mantled the Afghan Military Forces.3 
With limited effort in January 2003, the 
government established the National 
Disarmament Commission, an over-
sight body tasked with implementing 
the internationally led disarmament 
effort—the Afghan New Beginnings 
Programme. President Hamid Karzai 
and his administration moved quickly 
to bolster the National Disarmament 
Commission, expanding its initial man-
date to include the collection, stockpil-
ing and eventual transfer of one million 
weapons to the Afghan Ministry of 
Defense depot in Kabul. Viewed by 
many as an effort to preempt any inter-
national disarmament effort, the pro-
gram displayed a lack of transparency, 
and a host of questionable dealings led 
many observers to doubt its legitimacy. 
The government has yet to release the 
program’s final figures.1
International pressure mounted 
against the expansion of the National 
Disarmament Commission. In March 
2003, the international community 
pushed the Afghan government to 
establish the Afghan New Beginnings 
Programme, led by the United Nations 
Development Programme. The National 
Disarmament Commission and its tasks were integrated into 
the new program, which then began its own DDR program. 
Initially, the organization’s goal was collecting weapons from 
100,000 Afghan Military Forces combatants, but the number 
was not calculated on the basis of a thorough needs assess-
ment. Spontaneous demobilization and fluctuating member-
ship is characteristic of Afghan militias, and after one year of 
operation, estimates were lowered to 60,000 participants.4 In 
fact, the Small Arms Survey notes that virtually no standard 
preparatory and investigatory measures were taken to deter-
mine needs, capacities or best practices before the launch of 
the Afghan New Beginnings Programme.1 
AMF groups submitted a list of fighters to the Ministry of 
Defense in Kabul. Ministry of Defense staff verified these lists, 
and trusted community leaders received them for approval. If 
the fighters met eligibility criteria—essentially, if they had at 
least eight months of prior service and the ability to submit 
a serviceable weapon upon disarmament—then they surren-
dered their weapons and started the process of reintegration. 
The reintegration process began with a meeting between a 
combatant and a case worker, in which the case worker rec-
ommended possible avenues of reintegration—i.e., future edu-
cation, vocational training, etc. Afterward, militiamen were 
discharged under the condition that they swear off violence. 
In the program’s first phases, militiamen were given cash pay-
ments, but this ended after authorities discovered that former 
commanders seized these funds.1 
Though the program began successfully, issues of fraud 
and pilfering surrounded it. In some cases, command-
ers were suspected of providing their least loyal and most 
poorly trained fighters for disarmament, which happened 
in previous National Disarmament Commission programs.4 
Moreover, cash incentives led many to register under falsified 
identification. Old lines of patronage and loyalty still existed, 
threatening government legitimacy, authority and the rule of 
law. To address these problems, the Afghan New Beginnings 
Programme began the Commander Incentive Programme 
in 2004 and offered a generous package to commanders 
willing to comply with DDR efforts. A new law prohibiting 
political ties to militia groups, which effectively banned polit-
ically ambitious commanders from upcoming elections, and 
according to Small Arms Survey, a shift in U.S. policy toward 
promoting DDR efforts created a climate for success.1 By mid-
2006, 460 commanders of the 550 identified had participated 
in the program.1 
In 2006, the DDR mandates expired, and the final par-
ticipants gave up their weapons in a ceremony with Afghan 
President Hamid Karzai.5  The removal of Afghan Military 
Tribal and religious leaders gather 
following a shura held by Afghan 
President Hamid Karzai in Kandahar, 
Afghanistan. 
Photo courtesy of U.S. Navy Petty Officer 
1st Class Mark O’Donald.
Members of a combined Afghan and coalition security force 
collected a cache of weapons after clearing a known Haqqani 
network foreign fighter encampment site in Paktitka prov-
ince, Afghanistan. The insurgents had stockpiled weapons, 
including rocket-propelled grenade launchers, heavy machine 
guns and AK-47 assault rifles.
Photo courtesy of International Security Assistance Force.
Forces from the Ministry of Defense budget, the disband-
ment of militia checkpoints and the restriction of com-
mander privileges positively affected Afghan civilians, 
former combatants and security forces within Afghanistan. 
By significantly reducing militia arsenals and optimistically 
reintegrating former soldiers, the program has fostered a 
more stable environment in the country. However, the situ-
ation remains tenuous, and observers worry that, if tensions 
escalate, the decommissioned units could quickly remobi-
lize.1 Furthermore, Afghan New Beginnings Programme's 
efforts only addressed AMF personnel and did not disband 
armed groups outside of the Northern Alliance. 
Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups
During the formal DDR of Afghan Military Forces mem-
bers, President Karzai issued a decree making all non-AMF 
militias in Afghanistan illegal. In 2005, the Canadian govern-
ment offered a grant to establish the Disbandment of Illegal 
Armed Groups program, charged with fostering, promot-
ing and conducting disarmament and disbandment of armed 
groups outside of the government. At first, officials estimated 
that more than 1,800 illegal militias with over 100,000 mem-
bers existed in Afghanistan. Not only do these militias pose a 
threat to the government’s authority and legitimacy, but they 
engage in the illegal arms and drug trade, further promoting 
black-market activities and supporting violent criminal fac-
tions within Afghanistan.1,6 According to the Programme of 
Action Implementation Support System, the United Nations’ 
informational resource for countering the illegal sale of small 
arms and light weapons, the new Disbandment of Illegal 
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In March 2012, the United Nations Mine Action Service appointed Agnès Marcaillou as Director.1 Marcaillou 
replaced  Justin Brady, who served as Acting Director 
from 11 April 2011 to 19 March 2012. Brady became 
Head of Office for the Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs for Somalia. 
Previously Chief of the Regional Disarmament 
Branch in the United Nations Office for Disarmament 
Affairs, Marcaillou worked for Kofi Annan, Secretary-
General of the United Nations, as the U.N. Deputy 
Spokesperson. She also worked for the American 
Division of the Department of Political Affairs as a 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General Akashi 
and at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament 
Research.2 Notably, Marcaillou served as Chief of Staff 
for the first Executive Secretary of the Organization for 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in the Hague.2 Photo courtesy  
of UNMAS.
A long-time women’s-rights advocate, Marcaillou is a 
former President of the Group on Equal Rights for Women 
at the United Nations.2 Similarly, she pioneered the first 
Gender Action Plan of the U.N. Secretariat.1 Marcaillou 
is a laureate of the NATO and U.N. Programme of 
Fellowship on Disarmament and a Fellow of the French 
Institut de Hautes Etudes de Défense Nationale (Institute 
of Higher National Defense Studies).2
UNMAS is responsible for U.N. mine clearance 
around the world. As Director, Marcaillou will bring her 
extensive experience in political affairs, conflict preven-
tion and post-conflict interventions, disarmament and 
non-proliferation.2 
~ Blake Williamson, CISR staff
see endnotes page 81
Agnès Marcaillou Appointed UNMAS Director
security situation is too volatile for many organizations to 
extend their efforts outside of the capital in Kabul. For fear of 
attacks by insurgent groups, NGOs are often forced to settle 
for less ambitious projects and half-measures.10
Though small-arms proliferation escalates the violence, 
hindering NGO work, the disarmament of Afghan militias 
and civilians proved immensely difficult under a weapons-
centric approach, as it addresses only the symptoms of under-
lying problems—i.e., the deep-rooted patronage culture and 
the appeal of illegal-commodity markets for poor civilians 
without viable alternatives.1,9,11 One solution may be to focus 
on incentivizing disarmament with development assistance, 
an approach that was previously pursued in limited ways. By 
providing development assistance to distressed communities, 
international and domestic actors can provide alternatives to 
the violent cycle of crime and insurgency.1,11 
On the other hand, coupling DDR with development 
assistance can lead insurgent groups to improperly connect 
humanitarian NGOs that deliver development assistance 
without political or military ties with Coalition forces, and 
this puts the NGOs in peril. One of the primary avenues for 
development assistance and local capacity-building is the 
NGO community, and various Afghan NGOs often deliver 
the development assistance. Yet, the more these NGOs asso-
ciate with the Afghan Government, foreign security forces 
and their disarmament mission, the more insurgents view 
them as foreign occupiers and targets for insurgent violence. 
U.S. and Coalition forces further distorted this association 
between NGOs and foreign military forces when they estab-
lished Provincial Reconstruction Teams. These Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams operate like humanitarian NGOs 
At a forward operating base in Kandahar, Afghanistan, explo-
sive ordnance disposal personnel prepare charges to blow 
up stockpiled bombs left behind by fleeing al-Qaeda troops.
Photo courtesy of U.S. Navy, Chief Photographer’s Mate Johnny 
Bivera.
Armed Groups program focused on two main initiatives:1,7 
1. To improve security through the disarmament and dis-
bandment of illegal armed groups
2. To provide basic development support to communities 
freed from the threats of illegal armed groups
These two interrelated initiatives were intended to provide 
an impetus for communities to disarm and reduce the need for 
illegal activities as a means of socioeconomic empowerment. 
However, benefits encouraging disarmament were provided at 
the community level, not at the individual level. Unlike the ini-
tial DDR programs, which were based largely on these indi-
vidual incentives to promote disarmament, the Disbandment 
of Illegal Armed Groups program activities primarily took a 
law-enforcement perspective.1 Problems similar to those faced 
in earlier DDR efforts encircled the project: Commanders sub-
mitted their least serviceable weapons and would often “dis-
arm” militias that had already been through the DDR process.1 
Thus, Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups’ efforts did not 
adequately reduce the militia arsenals, failed to provide sup-
port to ex-combatants seeking reintegration and could not 
create a viable security situation for disarmed communities. 
Because of these shortcomings, many regions deemed in com-
pliance to the Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups pro-
gram’s demands slipped back into violence. In 2010 alone, six 
compliant districts relapsed into insurgency, while only 12 
were brought into compliance.8 However, in spite of its logis-
tical issues and brief mandate, the Disbandment of Illegal 
Armed Groups program curbed the influence of illegal armed 
groups and militia leaders on the government.1
Current Situation and Future Obstacles
Afghanistan remains a country in conflict, and insurgent 
activities fuel the robust industry of its illegal black market. 
Militia leaders derive their authority from the pervasion of 
weapons and traditional patronage networks, which keeps 
Afghanistan in tumult and prevents many international 
actors from investing in capital-intensive projects. Security 
is an overwhelming concern for civilians and government 
and hinders the progress of development projects, economic 
enterprises and the rule of law.1,6,9,10 Arms and conflict prolif-
eration also prevents NGOs in the country from effectively 
providing assistance. 
As of 2006, Afghanistan was considered the “most dan-
gerous country in the world for aid agencies.”10 NGOs in 
Afghanistan became targets for insurgent groups that view 
internationally coordinated aid agencies and government-
supported Afghan NGOs as forms of external interference, 
even though staff are predominantly Afghan nationals. The 
but are extensions of the foreign mili-
tary forces and thus have strategic and 
political ends.10 
Conclusion
The struggle to disband armed 
groups is one of Afghanistan’s most 
prevalent problems, threatening civil-
ians, NGOs, commercial actors and the 
government. Despite numerous efforts, 
developing effective programs for con-
fronting illegal armed groups and the 
black market activities supporting them 
have yet to occur. However, some impor-
tant lessons from the past can guide and 
focus future efforts:
1. Reintegration and economic 
development are essential compo-
nents to discourage illegal armed 
groups, and demobilized militia 
members must be provided with 
alternative opportunities.
2. Weapons collection cannot serve 
as the focal point for Afghanistan’s 
DDR. It neither addresses the 
underlying causes for armed 
insurgency nor weakens the arse-
nals of these militias, and com-
manders generally hand over 
their weakest weapons and least 
trained fighters. 
3. Disarmament practitioners must 
provide illegal armed groups with 
disbandment incentives but must 
be careful to maintain the distinc-
tion between humanitarian NGOs 
and foreign military actors. Also, 
development assistance designed 
to encourage DDR must be pub-
licly distinguished from nonpar-
tisan, unaffiliated humanitarian 
work that other NGOs provide.
These three lessons are not easily 
applied, but if properly implemented, they 
could lead to a more stable and secure 
Afghanistan. By using development and 
not weapons collection as the driving force 
behind DDR in Afghanistan, practitioners 
can provide alternatives to illegal activi-
ties. Furthermore, practitioners can pro-
vide an impetus to disarm without 
alienating Afghan civilians who may see 
gun ownership as a necessity in a volatile 
security situation. By rejecting the weap-
ons-centric mentality, actors involved 
with DDR can focus on more tangible 
measures of success, such as the extent to 
which DDR activities reduce Afghanistan’s 
overall level of violence and illegal activity. 
Work focused primarily on removing the 
motivation to participate in illegal armed 
groups more easily accommodates the 
complex Afghan cultural identity and 
adapts to the long history of violent con-
flict in the country. 
~ Jeremiah Smith, CISR staff
See endnotes page 81
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